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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM
be their agreement.2 The writing need not be of a formal char-
acter; letters and telegrams are sufficient if the requisite intent
is found.3  Since the court stated the letters evidenced a contract,
the rule that any relevant testimony may be admitted to prove
that the document was not adopted as an integration, does not
apply. Evidence showing that no assent was made to a complete
and accurate integration is still permitted under such circum-
stances,5 and in fact the letters exchanged between the parties
in the instant case contained some variance. Some parol evidence
may have been appropriate to show the surrounding circumstances
out of which the agreement arose,6 if this would help clarify the
meaning of the language used by the parties.
The court reinforced the rule that a seller is not restricted to
tender the goods on any particular day, but may offer delivery at
any time during the contract term," so long as the seller does not
offer the goods at an unreasonable hour' or under circumstances
which may put the buyer in technical default." Nor does the
buyer's later willingness to accept delivery aid him, since' the
breach of contract excuses the seller from further performance on
his part.10
Agreements to Arbitrate
a. In sales memorandum: Since arbitration is -an inexpen-
sive, expeditious method of adjusting controversies, it is the policy
of the courts to encourage and uphold arbitration.1 However,
the intent to arbitrate must be clearly shown.12 For the second
time in two years, the court was presented with the vexing prob-
lem of whether such an intention was sufficiently evidenced by the
signing of an agreement which referred to rules of a trade associa-
tion including among them a mandatory arbitration clause. The
2. Fricdman & Co. v. Newman, 255 IN. Y. 340, 174 N. E. 703 (1931) ; Chapin v.
Dobson, 78 N. Y. 74 (1879); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 633, (Riv. ed. 1936).
3. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, §228, Comment (a). Ilus. 2; 3 CoRmI, op. cit.,
§588 (1951).
4. 3 CoRBN, op. cit., §577.
5. Id. § 582. See Hale. The Parol Evidence Rule, 4 OR. L. REv. 91 (1925).
6. St. Regis Paper Co. v. Hubbs, 235 N. Y. 30, 138 N. E. 495 (1923);
3 CogarN, op. cit., § 579.
7. Curtiss v. Howell, 39 N. Y. 211' (1868); Bahnsen & Co. v. Leaf, 203
App. Div. 618, 197 N. Y. Supp. 160 (1st Dep't 1922); 2 WILLISrOr, SALES,
§ 451 (1948).
8. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 124 (4).
9. Manners & Co. v. Hershenhorn & Sons, 280 App. Div. 711, 116 N. Y. S. 2d
532 (1st Dep't 1952).
10. Jardine, Matheson & Co. v. Huguet Silk Co.. 203 N. Y. 273, 96 N. E. 449
(1911) ; Gourd v. Healy, 206 N. Y. 423, 99 N. E. 1099 (1912).
11. Feuer Transportation, Inc. v. Local Union No. 445, 295 N. Y. 87, 65 N. E. 2d
178 (1946).
12. Lehman v. Ostrovsky, 264 N. Y. 130, 190 N. E. 208 (1934).
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court, in Riverdale Fabrics Corp. v. Tillinghast Stiles Co.,1" held
(4-3) that where a sales memorandum did not mention the settle-
ment of disputes by arbitration, .but merely contained recitation
that, "This contract is also subject to the Cotton Yarn Rules of
1938 as amended," one of which rules contained an exclusive ar-
bitration clause, no intention to proceed to arbitration was shown
and a stay of arbitration was granted.
14
Judge Van Voorhis distinguishing Level Export Corp. v.
Wolz Aiken & Co.,'5 stated that in the instant case the parties
are not deemed necessarily to have contemplated anything more
than that the cotton yarn rules should apply to the completion
of sales .under the agreement, whereas in the Level case
there was an "incorporation clause" which indicated a blankei
acceptance of the various trade association provisions. The
clause in the instant case was found to be similar in import
to that contained in the first case raising this issue in the New York
Courts.18
The court indicated that draftsmanship such as that contained
in the cotton yarn rules will be looked on with a wary eye because
of their tendency to lead the unwitting into arbitration against
their will.' 7 No particular form of words are necessary so long
as the intention to arbitrate is demonstrated. 8
Judge Desmond, a dissenter in Level, joined by Judge Dye
in this case, feels that the court without overruling that case puts
an opposite construction on lafiguage which has the same meaning
as the language in the Level case.'9 He points out that in none
of the three contracts (Gerseta, Level and this case) was there
anv actual mention of arbitration and hence all three failed to
include the "clear language" necessary to bind the parties to
arbitration. He would make consent to arbitrate a matter of fact
and not of law.
13. 306 N. Y. 288, 118 N. E. 2d-104 (1954).
14. C. P. A. §§ 1450, 1458 (2).
15. 305 N. Y. 82, 111 N. E. 2d 218 (1953). "This sales note is subject to the
provisions of the Standard Cotton Textile sales note which, by reference, is incorporated
as a part of this agreement and together herewith constitutes the entire contract between
buyer and seller." (Held, parties must proceed to arbitrate).
16. General Silk Importing Co. v. Gerseta Corp.. 200 App. Div. 786, 194 N. Y.
Supp. 15 (1st Dep't 1922), aff'd 234 N. Y. 513, 138 N. E. 427 (1922). "Sales are gov-
erned by raw silk rules adopted by the Silk Association of America." Held, no inten-
tion to arbitration shown.
17. Cf. Philip Export Corp. v. Leatherstone, Inc., 275 App. Div. 102, 87 N. Y. S.
2d 665 (1st Dep't 1949).
18. Lehman v. Ostrovsky, supra note 12.
19. The history of the instant case in the courts below indicates that not only
businessmen, but the courts also have difficulty in differentiating between the permissible
and the unpermissible in this field. See 3 BFLo. L. Rxv. at 87 (1953).
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Judge Froessel, in a memorandum opinion, believes that the
words-'"This contract," since they are far broader than-
"Sales" used in Gersetta brings this case within the holding of
the Level case.
There is some authority even prior to the Level case for the
proposition that where an arbitration clause is incorporated by
reference, even though not specifically mentioned, it will suffice
to indicate an intention to arbitrate.2  The law has not been
modified since, so as to protect those who intend to have arbitra-
tion handled by their particular trade association from a unilateral
breach of this agreement. In most cases both parties are mem-
bers of the same association, or at least are thoroughly familiar
with its rules.
b. Signing the agreement: At common law, while even oral
contracts to arbitrate an existing dispute were enforceable, unless
in contravention of the Statute of Frauds,21 all agreements to arbi-
trate a future dispute were unenforcible. 22 New York statute law
has substantially changed the common law rules. Now every
submission of a present dispute to arbitration must be evidenced
by a written contract.
23
In Helen Whiting, Inc. v. Trojan Textile Corp.,2 4 a buyer
orally agreed to purchase over 80,000 yards of various goods from
a textile manufacturer. On the same day, the textile firm sent writ-
ten contracts to their buyer covering the entire transaction and in-
cluding provisions for arbitration. Three days later invoices were
sent to the buyer and the following day, the buyer requested and
got delivery of five yards against each of the contracts. Two
days later, the buyer informed the textile firm that it could only
use one kind of the merchandise and signed and sent back only
one of the three contracts. The buyer moved for a stay of arbi-
tration. The Court of Appeals held, Judge Froessel and Van
Voorhis dissenting, that all three contracts were accepted, that
part performance took them out of the Statute of Frauds and that
a binding agreement to- arbitrate is present, even as to the two
contracts not signed.
The court indicated that the oral agreements of the parties
clearly demonstrated that a binding agreement had been made
between the parties. Further proof, if any were needed, was
furnished by the fact that the buyer retained the contracts for
20. Hines v. Ziegfeld, 222 App. Div. 543, 226 N. Y. Supp. 562 (ist Dep't 1928).
21. French v. New. 28 N. Y. 147 (1863).
22. Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N. Y. 377 (1868).
23. C. P. A. § 1449.
24. 307 N. Y. 360, 121 N. E. 2d 367 (1954).
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six days,5 and' in the meantime, accepted invoices for some of
the goods and received actual delivery of part of the goods.
This latter delivery satisfied the Statute of Frauds,20 since it
was found that the goods were not sent for approval and were
not rierely samples of the subject matter of the sale. -7
The finding of an agreement to arbitrate was also supported
by the fact of the retention of the contracts and by the buyer
never objecting to their inclusion, and indeed, by his signing one
of the three contracts containing this provision. 28  The fact that
tho buyer had never signed two of the contracts, although it was
found to have accepted them, was found to be without legal ef-
fect, since the statute, in terms merely provides that an agreement
to arbitrate a future controversy must be contained in a written
contract, which as shown above, may in certain circumstances be
accepted without signing it. 29
The dissenters felt that since no mention of arbitration was
made at the original meeting, the "contracts" containing an arbi-
tration clause were not acknowledgments of a contract, but were
counter-offers adding a provision for arbitration.
The interpretation of the arbitration statute seems to be
sound, since the court declined to go farther than the Legislature
provided when it modified the common law rule. Arbitration by
entrapment need not be feared, because the instances of finding
an acceptance of a written contract without a signing of same are
rare.
Conditions Precedent
The liability of a party to perform his promise is frequently
made dependent upon a condition precedent, and, generally, un-
less such a condition precedent is performed no liability attaches
25. "A party by receiving and retaining under certain circumstances a written
agreement signed by another party may be bound by the terms of such writing, though
his signature does not appear thereon." Murray v. Cunard Steamship Co., 235 N. Y. 162,
167, 139 N. E. 226, 228 (1923). See Atlantic Dock Co. v. Leavitt, 54 N. Y. 35 (1873) ;
Schnurr v. Quinn, 83 App. Div. 70, 82 N. Y. Supp. 468 (2d Dep't 1903) ; 1 WILLISTON,
CoNTRAcrs, § 90A (Rev. ed. 1936).
26. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 85.
27. Samples are never regarded as part of the subject matter of the sale. Cleve.
land Worsted Mills Co. v. J. C. Brownstone & Co., 190 N. Y. Supp. 601 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
28. The court mentioned that its own experience proves that arbitration clauses are
commonly used in the textile industry.
29. Japan Cotton Trading Co. v. Farber, 233 App. Div. 354, 253 N. Y. Supp. 290
(1st Dep't 1931); Exeter Mfg. Co. v. Narrus, 254 App. Div. 496, 5 N. Y. S. 2d 438
(1st Dep't 1938) reached this result in interpreting the statute on similar facts. The
Court of Appeals indicated that it favored this rule in Gantt v. Felipe y Carlos Hurtado
& Cia, 297 N. Y. 433, 79 N. E. 2d 815 (1948), but declined, at that time, to expressly so
hold.
